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1. Introduction 
We consider the following problem: 
There are N spatially separated markets for a homogeneous commodity. The 
supply and demand functions at each market are linear and depend only on the price 
at that market; the commodity can be shipped between any two markets at a fixed 
unit cost. The problem is to find the price at each market and flows between the 
markets that determine an equilibrium (to be defined later). 
This problem is called the spatial or network equilibrium problem; for a complete 
historical survey see Takayama nd Judge (1971). 
Spatial equilibrium problems have important real-world applications. For exam- 
ple, agricultural economists solve commodity equilibrium problems using 
algorithms developed for the spatial equilibrium problem. Hall et al. (1975) state the 
basic equilibrium model used by Chowdhury, Heady, and Bhide (1981) to evaluate 
the impact of energy policy and prices on crop production and distribution in the 
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United States. The spatial equilibrium problem is very similar to those modelled by 
the Project Independence Energy (PIES) Model (Ahn and Hogan (1981)) and the 
traffic assignment problem (Aashtiani and Magnanti (1979) and Dafermos (1980)). 
Applications of both of these models have been discussed extensively in the 
literature. 
Computing an equilibrium is non-trivial due to the interaction between the 
markets through the possibility of shipment. If shipping costs were zero (i.e., no 
spatial separation), or if shipping costs were infinite (i.e., completely separate 
markets), an equilibrium could be found by solving single variable linear equations. 
Therefore, without the interaction produced by the spatial configuration an 
equilibrium would be trivial to compute. The idea behind our algorithm is to start 
with a trivial problem, with no interaction between markets, and gradually in- 
troduce spatial interaction until the original problem is solved. Since it can be 
thought of as a homotopy and has a variable-dimension mplementation, we call it 
a variable-dimension homotopy algorithm. We have adopted the 'variable- 
dimension' in our title from the fixed point algorithms of Van der Laan and Talman 
(1979), Kojima and Yamamoto (1982), and Yamamoto (1983) and the complemen- 
tarity algorithm of Van der Heyden (1980). 
The approach taken is to assume that an equilibrium for markets 1 through K -  1 
is given. Then the equilibrium for markets 1 through K is computed using the K -  1 
market equilibrium (extended in a straightforward way) as the starting point in the 
computation. We will show that if the excess-demand function (i.e., demand minus 
supply) for market K is 'shifted' (i.e., the constant term is changed), the K -  1 market 
equilibrium is an equilibrium for the K market problem. A homotopy is produced 
by gradually moving the K-th market's excess-demand curve back to its original 
position. This produces a series of equilibria for modified problems ending with an 
equilibrium for the original K market problem. Obviously, the equilibrium for one 
market is trivial to compute. Therefore, after N -  1 applications of the preceeding 
strategy, we will have an equilibrium for the full economy. 
We claim that this approach is appropriate for two reasons. First, it allows us to 
exploit a market structure in which there are a few large demanders and suppliers 
and many much smaller markets; we call this dominant market structure. Once the 
equilibrium for the dominant markets is found, adding a much smaller market 
should not substantially alter the equilibrium. In other words, the initial solution 
for subsequent subproblems hould be near an equilibrium. Therefore, when 
substantial changes in the equilibrium occur the dimension is low, and in higher 
dimensions the number of iterations needed to solve the subproblems is small. Com- 
putationally, this implies that the algorithm should perform most of its work in 
lower dimensions. We will supply computational evidence to show that this is indeed 
the case. Second, using standard network data structures, the algorithm can be im- 
plemented irectly on the underlying network of the problem. Together, these two 
features yield an algorithm that, with relatively low storage requirements, can effec- 
tively process large problems. 
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It is not hard to imagine that for some problems (or for some orderings of the 
markets) the approach we have described could work very badly. A total of N-1 sub- 
problems must be solved, the last of which is as big as the original problem. If the 
subproblems require substantial computational effort, our approach could be 
disastrous. Of course, we don't expect his to be the case since for most subproblems 
the initial solution should be close to an equilibrium. In Section 7 we supply com- 
putational evidence to justify the variable-dimension approach. 
Several authors have proposed network algorithms for the single-commodity pro- 
blem. Glassey (1978) proposed a network algorithm based on principal pivoting 
(Cottle and Dantzig (1968)). Pang and Lee (1981) implemented a network version 
of parametric principal pivoting which was used by Pang (1981) in an iterative 
scheme to solve the multicommodity case. Our motivation for looking at this pro- 
blem is due, in part, to the success of these authors in developing network com- 
plementarity schemes. Our algorithm is new, in the sense that it is not a network 
specialization of an existing general matrix algorithm. It exploits problem structure 
found in typical instances of the spatial equilibrium problem and solves large-scale 
problems effectively. 
To update the K-1 market equilibrium to a K market equilibrium, we use a com- 
plementarity pivoting strategy with a simple economic interpretation. It differs from 
principal or parametric principal pivoting, both of which could be modified and us- 
ed here. The particular pivoting strategy to update the equilibrium is probably not 
as important as implementing the algorithm in the variable-dimension fashion 
outlined above. Our approach is based on the work of Saigal (1983). 
In the next section we give a brief historical summary of the network equilibrium 
problem and show that the problem can be formulated as a linear complementarity 
problem. In Section 3 we state some preliminaries needed throughout the paper, and 
in Section 4 we show that the algorithm we are proposing can be interpreted as a 
simple variable-dimension homotopy. In Section 5 we show that under a non- 
degeneracy assumption the algorithm terminates with an equilibrium. In Section 6 
we give a simple degeneracy-resolving procedure based on the underlying network 
structure of the problem, and in Section 7 we summarize the computational results. 
2. Problem formulation 
A network equilibrium problem can be viewed either as an optimization problem 
or as an equilibrium problem. In 1951 Enke formulated a single commodity network 
problem with three markets and worked directly with the resulting equilibrium con- 
ditions. Following Enke's paper, Samuelson (1952) wrote an influential paper show- 
ing that the equilibrium problem is equivalent to an optimization problem and is a 
generalization of the Hitchcock/Koopmans transportation problem (Hitchcock 
(1941), Koopmans and Reiter (1951)). Subsequent works treated the network 
equilibrium problem as an optimization problem. For example, Takayama and 
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Judge (1971) worked extensively on the problem and its many variants, testing some 
quadratic programming algorithms for solving both the single and the multiple com- 
modity problem. Later Matieson (1974, 1977) and Peterson (1976) showed that the 
network equilibrium problem can be formulated as a complementarity problem (see 
also Asmuth, Eaves, and Peterson (1979)). The complementarity formulation works 
directly with the equilibrium conditions, as in Enke (1951). In this same spirit, we 
formulate and solve this problem as an equilibrium problem. 
To formulate and solve the problem we must introduce some notation. Given N 
markets for a single commodity, define 
<K> = {1, 2, 3,. . .K}, K<_N, 
Pi = price at market i, 
xi, y=flow from market i to market j (i:#j), 
zi= bi + di Pi = excess demand at market i, i = 1,... N, and 
c;,j = unit cost of shipping from market i to market j, i#=j. 
For each market, the function zi is the difference between the market's demand 
and supply function. We assume that the excess-demand functions are linear, 
downward sloping, and satisfy z(0)>0 (i.e., b, d>0).  Also, we assume that the 
transportation costs are non-negative and satisfy the triangle inequality, namely, 
that 
O<~Ci, k~Ci ,  jd-Cj,  k ,  i,j, ke<N> (iCj#=k). 
The network equilibrium problem is to find prices and flows that satisfy the 
equilibrium conditions. All vectors in this paper are real valued. 
Definition. A vector (p, x) of dimension N 2 is an equilibrium for nodes (N> iff 
(1) (Excess) Demand-(Net)  Imports=0: 
bi-diPi+ ~ xi, k -  ~ xk, i=O, i t (N) ,  
k ~e i k ~e i 
(2) Profits = 0: 
pi-pj+Cc, j>_O, i, j~ <N), i~ej, 
(3) Losses  = 0: 
Xi, j(Pi--pj+Ci, j)=O, i, j 6 (N) ,  ig:j. 
The equilibrium conditions can be expressed in matrix form as 
(1) Dp-A ' rx -b=O,  
(2) Ap+c>_0,  and 
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(3) xT(A p+c)=O,  
where 
D = diag(d 1, d2, d3, ..., dN), 
P = (P l ,  P2, P3, - "  PN) T, 
X= (XI, 2, Xl,3, ...Xl, N;X2,3, .-- X2, N; 
• "" ;XN, 1, XN, 2, ""XN, N- I )  T, 
-AT=the  Nx(N- I )  node arc incidence matrix for the 
complete digraph with N nodes, 
b = (bl, b2, b3, ... bN) T, and 
C= (Cl, 2, C1,3,--" CI, N;C2, l, ¢2,3, ""¢2, N; 
• .. ;cN, 1, c/v, 2, ... cN, N- l) T. 
Next, we want to show that solving the equilibrium conditions is equivalent to 
solving a linear complementarity problem (LCP). Define 
[°o [px] [:] M= A , q= , y= , and u= , 
where u is the vector of slack variables for the constraints in conditions (1) and (2). 
Note that p, o, and -b  are N-dimensional vectors; x, w, and ¢ are N(N-1) -  
dimensional vectors; and M is an N2x  N 2 matrix. Consider the LCP: 
Find (y, u) of dimension N 2 satisfying 
(1) M y+q=u,  
(2) y, u_  0, and (LCP) 
(3) yTu = O. 
Notice that the LCP requires the demand constraint and its complementary 
variable, price, to satisfy complementarity (i.e., at most one can be positive), 
whereas the equilibrium conditions require the demand constraint to equal zero. 
Thus it would seem that the LCP is more general than the equilibrium conditions. 
The following lemma shows that under mild assumptions the LCP and the 
equilibrium conditions are equivalent. 
Lemma 2.1. I f  z(O) > 0 (i.e., if  b > 0), then the LCP stated above and the equilibrium 
conditions are equivalent. 
Proof. It suffices to show that any solution (p, x; u, w) to the LCP satisfies p>0 
(consequently, by complementarity o = 0). Suppose not. Define 
136 P.C. Jones et al. 
I= {ie <N> ]pi=O} ¢O. 
Then r,i ~ I zi (0) > O; therefore, there exists j e < N> \ I (note, pj > O) with xj, i > 0 for 
some i e I. By complementarity, xj i > 0 implies 
Pj--pi+cj, i=PjWCj, i=O. 
This implies pj= -cj, i<_O, a contradiction; this proves the lemma. [] 
Therefore, to solve the equilibrium conditions it suffices to solve the LCP stated 
above. We will refer to this problem at the Network Linear Complementarity Pro- 
blem (NETLCP). When convenient, we will drop the 0 vector in the solution and 
denote a solution by (p, x; w). 
It is not hard to see that NETLCP has a solution. Since M is positive semi- 
definite, if there exists a vector satisfying equilibrium conditions (1) and (2), then 
the LCP has a solution (Cottle and Dantzig (1968)). It is easy to see that such a vec- 
tor exists for NETLCP. 
Lemma 2.2. NETLCP has a solution. 
Proof. Define 
g(t)= ~ Zi(t), t>_O. 
ie<N> 
Then g(. ) is continuous and satisfies g(0)> 0 and g(t)< 0 for large t. Consequently, 
there exists t o with g(to)= 0. Let x be any feasible flow for the transshipment pro- 
blem with supplies and demands given by zi (to). It is easy to see that the vector 
(to, to,.., to, x; c) is a feasible vector for NETLCP. [] 
3. The algorithm: Background 
The problem has been formulated as a LCP, and the algorithm could be described 
in matrix terms using simplex type pivots. It is more natural, however, to exploit 
the underlying network structure to describe the algorithm and prove convergence. 
We first show that the solution has a tree structure, and then we use it to present 
the algorithm. The presentation is similar to Glassey (1978). 
First, we make the following definitions. 
Definition. Given x, the vector of flows for nodes <N>, define Ax, the set of  
positive arcs with respect o x, by 
Ax= {(i, j)]xi, j>O, i , j  e <N> }. 
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Definition. Given Ax, for each ie (N)  define 5 + (i), the set of  positive arcs into i, 
by 
d~ + (i) = { (j, i) I (j, i) ~ Ax, J ~ (N)  }, 
and define #-( i) ,  the set of positive arcs out of i, by 
~-( i )  = {( i , j ) l ( i , j )eAx,  je  (N)}.  
The following lemma describes the underlying tree structure of an equilibrium. 
Lemma 3.1. NETLCP has a solution (p, x; w) for which A x satisfies 
(1) ( (N),  Ax) is a forest, 
(2) 5+0) =0 or ~-(i)=13, i~ (N) .  
That is, the set of  positive arcs form a forest, and no market both imports and ex- 
ports. (If a solution satisfies (2) it is said to have no transshipment.) 
Proof. See Glassey (1978). [] 
A forest that satisfies condition (2) of Lemma 3.1 is called an Alternating Forest; 
a solution (p, x; w) for which ( (N) ,  Ax) is an alternating forest is called an Alter- 
nati, ng Forest Equilibrium. At each pivot of the algorithm the solution is an alter- 
nating forest equilibrium. 
Let (p, x) be an equilibrium for nodes (K -  1 ). For i, j ~ (K -  1 ) define q+ and 
qf  so that 
Pi -- q+ + ci, K = O, 
or, equivalently, as 
q+ = Pi  + Ci, K ,  
Note that 
Define 
and qf -p j+Cr ,  y=O, 
and qf=py--CK, j. 
q+ = minimum price at K for i to export to K, 
qf  = maximum price at K for K to export to j. 
and 
L=Max{qf}  and U=min{q+}. 
j i 
Lemma 3.2. I f  (p, x) is an equilibrium for nodes (K -  1 ), then the triangle ine- 
quality implies that L <_ U. 
Proof. Since (p, x) is an equilibrium, i, j~  (K -1  ) implies 
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O<Pi--pj+ci, j 
<pi-pj+ci, x+cK, j
:q~ -q f  . 
Consequently, qf <_ q~ for i~j .  Since c_  0, 
q7 =Pi--CK, i<-Pi+Ci, K=q +, i~(K -  1). 
Therefore, L_  U. [] 
Define Px so that 
zx(Pr) = 0 (i.e., Px = bx/dr). 
To extend the K -  1 node solution to a solution for nodes (K)  there are three cases 
to consider. They are 
(1) L<_pK<U, or 
(2) Px>U, or 
(3) Pr<L. 
If Case (1) holds, it is trivial to find an equilibrium for nodes (K)  since node Kwill 
be isolated (i.e., no shipment in or out) at an equilibrium. Thus (p', x ' )  is an alter- 
nating forest equilibrium for nodes <K), where 
p'i=Pi, i e (K -1 )  
I 
Px =Px, and 
otherwise. 
Therefore, only cases (2) and (3) need to be considered. If case (2) holds, at the 
equilibrium for nodes (K) ,  node K will be an importing node, whereas if case (3) 
holds, node K will be an exporting node. Since cases (2) and (3) are completely 
analogous we will consider only case (2). The next section shows that either case can 
be handled using a simple homotopy algorithm. 
4. The algorithm: A variable dimension homotopy 
It is well known (Eaves and Scarf (1976)) that the linear complementarity problem 
can be transformed into the problem of finding a zero of a piecewise linear function 
from I~ to [~. We first show this equivalence and then use it to show that the 
algorithm can be viewed as a homotopy method. 
For ye  [K ~v define y+ ,y -  ~ [pN by 
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y+ =Max{Yi, 0}, and y/- =Max{-y / ,  0}. 
For M, and N×N matrix, and/ ,  the N×N identity matrix, define the piecewise 
linear function F:  ~Jv~ ~N by 
F(y)=I y-  -My  + 
Let z =y+ and u =y- .  Then F(y)= q if and only if (z, u) solves the LCP determin- 
ed by M and q. 
Let (p, x; w) be a solution to NETLCP for nodes <K- 1 ). Let FK( • ) be the cor- 
responding function described above for the <K) node problem. If we define the 
corresponding right-hand-side, 
- b r] ql= 
C K , 
in the obvious way, we must solve Fr( .)=ql. To solve the problem using a 
homotopy, we change one coordinate of ql, solve the problem for the deformed 
vector (p0), and trace the solution as the deformation is gradually removed. Let q0 
equal q~ except in its K-th coordinate (corresponding to the constant erm in the 
excess-demand function at node K), where qO= U dr. Define (p0, x0;w 0) of 
dimension K 2 by 
p°i =p~, i t<K- l )  
pO= U, 
xg . -~ xi,j' i, j e<K-1) ,  and 
" J -  (0, otherwise, 
w°j=P°i-P°+Ci, j i , j~<K). 
Lemma 4.1 shows that this extension of the <K- 1 ) node solution is a solution for 
the (K) node problem in which excess demand at node K is changed. 
Lemma 4.1. (p0, x0; w o) as defined above is a solution for the NETLCP determin- 
ed by nodes <K) in which demand at node K is given by 
z°(pr)=u dr-dK Px. 
Proof. We must show that conditions (1), (2), and (3) for the corresponding LCP 
are satisfied. 
(1) Note that when pK = U, z°(pr)=O. Since the prices and flows for nodes 
(K -1  ) are unchanged from the old solution, condition (1) must be satisfied for 
each i ~ (K). 
(2) From the definition of U 
w°K=p°-p°  + c , , r=q? - V>_o. 
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Also, by Lemma 3.2 and the definition of L 
w °, i= U-p°+cx, i>_L-p°+cx, i>_O. 
Since the old prices are unchanged, w°j>O for i, j~  (K -1 ) .  
(3) Since x °, . -x9 ,  ,,x = 0 for i e (K -1  ), complementarity follows from the com- 
plementarity of the (K -  1) node solution. [] 
Define yO so that 
[,o I [o] (yO)-= x ° , and (yO)+= w ° . 
Lemma 4.1 implies that FK(y °) =qO. Now consider the homotopy produced by 
solving 
FK(y)=t q0+( l _ t )  ql,  for 0_<t_<l. (.) 
When t = 0, the (extended) solution for nodes (K -  1 ) solves (,). As t increases, the 
solutions to (,) produce a sequence of solutions to augmented NETLCPs for nodes 
(K) .  When t = 1, the homotopy produces the solution to the original problem. The 
solutions are traced out by performing complementary pivots on NETLCP. We 
have chosen to describe the pivoting operation utilizing the underlying network 
structure of the problem. This approach is explained in the next section. 
5. The algorithm: Pivoting and convergence 
In this section we describe a 'generic' pivot of the algorithm. It is stated for the 
case in which node K is an importer (i.e., ,OK> U); the case in which K is an ex- 
porter, however, is completely analogous. First, we describe the initial pivot to show 
how the algorithm is performed. We then show that subsequent pivots do not 
significantly differ from the initial pivot. The derivations are used to show that 
under a non-degeneracy assumption the algorithm is finite. In Section 6 we show 
that a simple tiebreaking procedure insures finite termination even in the presence 
of degeneracy. First we need some notation. 
From Lemma 4.1 we know that an alternating forest solution for nodes (K -  1 ) 
can be extended to an alternating forest solution for nodes (K)  in which demand 
at node K is given by 
Z~.(px)=b~.--dKPx, b~c=U d x. 
Let (p, x; w) be the resulting solution for nodes (K).  Since ((K), Ax) is a forest, 
it can be decomposed uniquely into a disjoint collection of trees, 
Q={Tm=(Fm, Em)[m=I,Z,...,M}, 
where Fm is a set of nodes, and Era is a set of arcs. Also, 
z(p) 
and 
b K 
d K U = b~ \ 
"-,: \ 
\ \ \ \ \  
I " "~ "1 
L U PK 
P 
Fig. 1. Initial position of homotopy. 
M 
<K>= U Fro, P, n6=o if i . j ,  
m=l 
M 
a) 
A~: U em, ein~:o if i:/:j. 
m=l 
(Note that if Fi consists of a single isolated node of T, Ei= 0.) 
We assume Px=br/dr> U= b~/dr, which implies b'r<br; namely, that excess 
demand_at node K is 'shifted down'. Fig. 1 shows the initial position of the excess- 
demand funcuon. 
To summarize the algorithm (see Fig. 2 ) -  initially, the constant term of the 
Reverse Are Deleted 
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O 
b) Forward Are Added 
Fig. 2. Summary of algorithm. 
O 
142 P.C. Jones et al. 
excess-demand function at node K equals dr  U. Equivalently, the price at node K 
initially equals U. This is the minimum price at which some node of (K -  1 ) will 
ship to K; the corresponding arc if the first entering variable. As the constant erm 
increases, price at each node in the tree containing K increases making these nodes 
'more attractive' for imports. Also, flow increases on forward arcs and decreases 
on reverse arcs. If the constant erm can increase to its original value before some 
other variable reaches zero, the algorithm terminates with a solution. Otherwise, 
either the flow on a reverse arc reaches zero and the arc is deleted, or a node outside 
the tree wishes to ship into the tree and the corresponding arc is added. The process 
is repeated until the constant erm is returned to its original value. 
The next lemma shows that the initial pivot can be made so that the alternating 
forest structure of the solution is preserved. 
Lemma 5.1. Let (p, x) be an alternating forest equilibrium for  nodes (K -  1 ), and 
let [L, U] be defined as above. Then there exists i ~ <K- 1 ) satisfying 
(1) g+ (i)=O (i.e., i does not import), and 
(2) qi + =U. 
(Recall, q/+ =Pi + el, r and U= mini {q/+ }.) 
Proof. Suppose j is an importing node satisfying qf  = U. Then there exists 
i e (K -1 )  with xi, j>0;  therefore, pi-pj+ci,  j=O. Since qj+ =U, we have p j+ 
Cy, r<_pi+ Ci, K, which implies 
O<-pi+ ci, r - (p j+  cj, x)<-Pi-pj+ ci, j=O. 
(Note that Ci, k <--Ci, j+Cj, k = Ci, k--Cj, k <--Ci, j.) 
Consequently, q+ = qfl = U, and since (p, x) is an alternating forest equilibrium, 
i must not import. This proves the lemma. [] 
As mentioned earlier, two slightly different pivots can occur depending on 
whether an arc is added to or deleted from the solution. Initially, an arc is added 
to the solution. Let i be a non-importing satisfying q/+ = U. At each pivof 
T--(F, E) is the tree on which prices and flows change. Initially, T is given by 
F=F( i )U{K} and E=E( i )k J{( i ,K)},  
where, by definition, T(i) = (F(i), E(i)) ~ Q is the tree containing i. 
For 0>_0 define bx(O)=b'x+O. For any variable, for example Pi, let Pi be the 
variable's current value and Pi (") its value as a function of 0. The algorithm pro- 
ceeds by increasing 0 while maintaining the equilibrium conditions until 
(1) bx(O)=bx, or 
(2) xk, l ( . )=0 for some (k, I )~E, or 
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(3) wk, t(')=pk--pt(')+Ck, t=O, ke(K) \Fand  IeF. 
If (1) occurs, the algorithm terminates with a solution to the original problem for 
nodes (K). If (2) or (3) occurs, the new solution is an alternating forest equilibrium 
for nodes (K) in which b/c(0) is the new value for the constant term in K's excess- 
demand function (b'x<b/c(O)<b/c). The variable that reaches zero is called the 
blocking variable. If the blocking variable is a flow variable, its corresponding arc 
is-deleted from the forest, and another pivot is performed. If the blocking variable 
is a slack variable (i.e., a component of w), its complementary arc is brought into 
the forest. In the LCP, we are performing a 'complementary pivot'; when a variable 
reaches zero its complement is brought into the basis. In either case, F and E are 
updated, and another pivot is performed producing further increase in b~. In the 
absence of degeneracy (i.e., if there are no ties in the 0-ratio test) 0 is strictly 
positive, and, therefore, after a finite number of pivots b'r= b/e; the resulting solu- 
tion is an alternating forest solution for nodes (K).  
First, note that as 0 increases, all prices on F change by the same amount. Since 
all the arcs in E(i) have positive flow and pK=Pi+Ci, K, we have 
pi--pj+ci, j=O for (i,j)eE. 
Since all nodes in Fare connected by arcs in E, to maintain these equalities the prices 
at all nodes in F must change (in fact, increase) by the same amount. Consequently, 
there is a function, ~(0), for which 
pj(.)=pj+ ~(0), j~F. 
By flow conservation 
xi, KK(. )=  - ~] z~(pj(. )) 
j~F(i) 
= -  ~., [bj-dj(Pi+~u(O))] 
jeF(i) 
=-  E (bj-d rpj)+~(O) E dj 
j~ F(i) j~ F(i) 
= ¢t(O) D(F(i)) 
(for SC (N) define D(S)= ~jes dj). 
To maintain the equilibrium condition for demand at node K, we must have 
[b/c(O)-dK P/c(. )1 + xi,/c(" ) 
[b'r + O-die (PK+ ~(0))] + ~u(O) D(F(i)) 
[b'K-d/c P/c]-0+ ~,(0) [dr+ D(F(i))] 
O+ ~u(O) D(F). 
Therefore, ~(0)--O/D(F); this implies 
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pj(. )=pj+O/D(F), j~F .  
Next, we want to find the value of 0 at which each currently positive variable 
becomes a blocking variable. 
b K (0 )  = b K . (1) 
Define 
01=b :-b'K. 
Clearly, when 0= 0 I, bK(O)=bK. 
(2) xk, t (") = 0 for some (k, I) e E. 
Let (k, I) e E. Then deleting (k, I) splits T into two disjoint subtrees, TI = (FI, El ) 
and T2 = (F2, E2). We assume that K e F2. There are two cases to consider depen- 
ding on whether (k, I) is directed 'into' or 'out of' 7"i. (See Fig. 3.) These cases can 
be distinguished by orienting the arcs of T. 
Definition. Given a tree T rooted at K, arc (k, 1) e T is a forward (reverse) arc o f  
T with respect o node K if on any path containing (k, 1) and K, (k, 1) is directed 
toward (away from) K. 
(a) (k, l) is a forward arc. 
If (k, 1) is a forward arc with respect o K, by flow conservation 
xk, t(. )= - ~ zj(pj+ O/D(F)) 
jeFl 
= -  E tbj-dj pj-d: O/D(F)I 
j¢Fl 
a) (k,1) forward 
Fig. 3. 
) 
b) (k,1) reverse  
A variable-dimension homotopy 
=Xk, t+O/D(F) ~., dj 
jeF~ 
= Xk, t + 0 D(F  l ) /D(F) 
>xk, t. 
This shows that xk, t(" ) is increasing; 
variable. 
(b) (k, 1) is a reverse arc. 
If (k,/) is a reverse arc, 
xk, t(" )= ~ z j (p j ( .  )) 
jeF, 
= Xk, t-- 0 D(F~ )/D(F). 
Therefore, xk, t (") = 0 when 
0 = xk, t D(F)/D(F~ ). 
Define 
and 
(3) 
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therefore, Xk, t can never be a blocking 
0 2, t=xk, t D(F)/D(F~), 
03=min{O~,tlke (K )  \F ,  l eF} .  
The maximum value for 0 that preserves non-negativity is 
0= rain{0 l, 02, 03}. 
The new value of b~¢ is bk + 0, and all the other variables change accordingly. 
Next, we describe the necessary updating of the tree structure and show that 
and 
As 0 increases, all prices in F change (increase) by the same amount, and prices 
in KkF  do not change; therefore, Wk, t ( . )=wk,  t>_O for k, leF ,  or for 
k, l~ (K) \F .  If keF  and le  (K) \F ,  
w~, t(" ) =Px(" ) -P t+ Ck, t = Wk, t+ O/D(F)> Wk, t. 
This shows that the only slack variables wk, t that are candidates to be blocking 
variables are those for which ke  (K> \F  and l eF .  In this case 
wk, t( " ) =Pk --Pt( " ) + Ck, t = Wk, t-- O/D(F). 
Therefore, wk, t (") = 0 when 0 = D(F) wk, t. Define 
O~, t= D(F) wk, t 
02=min{O2,t I (k, t)is a reverse arc of  E} .  
Wk, t ( . )=pk- -P l ( . )+Ck,  t=O for some k~(K)  \Fand  I~F. 
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subsequent pivots produce additional increases in b~:. If O= 01 , the new solution is 
an alternating forest equilibrium for the original K node problem and the sub- 
problem is solved, otherwise, the tree structure is updated and another pivot is per- 
formed, let (p ' ,  x ' ;  w') be the new solution. Then (in the absence of degeneracy) 
if O=02=Ok, i, 
Ax,=AxU {(i, K)} \ {(k, 1)}. 
Ax, is still an alternating forest (deleting an arc preserved this structure); conse- 
quently, it is the disjoint union of trees. The tree structure is the same as before ex- 
cept that T(i) splits into the two subtrees described earlier, and node K is added at 
arc (i, K) to T2. Thus, we have 
Q'= { T~=(F~, E/,) I m= I, 2, ...,M}. 
The new T= (F, E) is T'(K)~ Q', the tree containing K (i.e., the old T2 with K 
added). 
If 0= 03 = 0~,z, 
Ax,=AxU{(i,K)}, 
and arc (k, l) will be added to ((K), Ax,) after the next pivot. Since l~F and 
k ~ (K ) \F ,  the tree structure is preserved. Thus we have 
Q'= { T/n=(F/n, E/n) I m= I, Z, . . . ,M-1}, 
where K is added to T(i) at (i, K). The same argument used in Lemma 5.1 can be 
used to show that k and I can be chosen so that k is an exporting node and I is an 
importing node. This preserves the alternating tree structure of subsequent solu- 
tions. The new T is given by T= (F, E), where 
F=F'(K)UF'(k) and E=E'(K)UE'(k)U{(k, 1)}. 
Note that arc (k, 1), which is to be added to the tree, is a forward arc with respect 
to K. 
The general pivot is essentially the same as the initial pivot. In general, at any 
stage of the algorithm we are given (p, x; w), an alternating forest equilibrium for 
nodes (K)  with demand at K given by 
ZK(Pr) = b'x- dx PK, 
where b~¢< bx. At the conclusion of the previous pivot either a reverse arc was 
deleted from the forest or a forward arc is to be added (e.g., the arc (i, K) was added 
to the forest after the initial pivot). We will show that in either case b~ can be 
increased. 
Suppose that an arc (k, l) was just deleted. As before, let br(O), the new cons- 
tant term at node K, equal 
bt,:(O)=b~+O, 0>_0. 
A variable-dimension homotopy 
Again, all prices in F must change by the same amount. Let 
p j ( . )=p j+ ~(0), j~F .  
Define A (-) so that 
jeg+(K) 
By flow conservation 
2 
j~J+(K) 
y., xj,~(. )= Z xj,~+ A(. ). 
j~J+(K) 
2 
jeF\{K} 
=-  ~, 
jeF\{K} 
=-  ~., 
j~FX{K} 
Xj, x(')= - zj (pj (.)) 
[bj- dj (pj+ ~u(O)] 
(b j -d jp j )+D(F \  {K}) ~(0). 
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This implies 
A( - )= ~(0) D(F \  {K}). 
To maintain the equilibrium condition for demand at node K we must have 
O=-[b~,+O-dK(px+~(O))]+ ~, Xzk(') 
j~a + (K) 
=-(b 'x -dxox)+ ~., Xj, K--O+dKqI(O)+A(') 
j+J+(K) 
= - 0 + qJ(O) D(F), 
which implies 
~(O)=O/D(F). 
Therefore, prices continue to increase in F as 0 increases. Since the deleted arc, 
(k, l), is a reverse arc, 
Wk, t(" ) =Pk(" ) --Pt + Ck, t = q/(O) > O. 
(When 0= O, Wk, t= 0.) This allows bk to increase. 
If the forward arc, (k, 1), will be added after the pivot, the same argument shows 
that 
~(0) = O/D(F); 
this shows that prices continue to increase in F. Since flow on forward arcs is in- 
creasing with 0, Xk, t(" ) must be increasing (currently Xk, l = 0); this permits further 
increase in b~¢. 
Thus, by an induction argument we have shown that in the absence of degeneracy 
each pivot produces a strictly monotone increase in b~. After a finite number of 
pivots b~: must reach its original value of bx. After N -  1 subproblems are solved 
we reach an equilibrium solution for the full N nodes. This proves finite con- 
vergence of the algorithm under a non-degeneracy assumption. 
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6. Resolution of degeneracy 
At each pivot of the algorithm if ties occur in the 0-ratio test, we need a tie break- 
ing procedure to perform a finite number of degenerate pivots followed by a non- 
degenerate pivot. In this section we give such a procedure. 
Let (p, x) be a solution generated by the algorithm. Suppose 
02._ 3 0 
t, J  - -  Ok, 1 : 
for (i, j)• G and (k, 1)e l l .  Note that G is the set of the reverse arcs in the old tree 
T on which flow reached zero, and H is the set of forward arcs with k outside and 
l inside T for which Wk, t(" ) reached 0. For a set FC(N) define 
v= {(k,/)lk• <K> \F, I•F, and wk, t=0}. 
(We suppress the dependence of V on F and (p, x).) Let (F, E) be defined as in the 
algorithm. Update (p, x) as outlined earlier given the value of 0, and let (p, x) be 
the new solution. Let 
Q={(Fm, Em) Im=I, 2,...,M} 
be the disjoint collection of trees corresponding to the positive arcs of x. For 
k • (K) let (F(k), E(k)) be the element of Q containing k. When ties occur in the 
0-ratio test, we perform the sequence of degenerate pivots given by the following 
algorithm (i.e., perform changes on the tree structure without changing (p, x)). 
Degenerate Pivot Algorithm 
Step O. Delete all arcs (i, j )  e G from E. Let (F, E) be the resulting tree containing 
node K. 
Step 1. If V=O, STOP. 
Step 2. Pick any (k, 1) • V. Replace (F, E) by F +- FU F(k) and 
E,--EUE(k)U(k,I). 
Return to Step 1. 
The details of degeneracy and the proof that the degenerate pivot algorithm 
resolve degeneracy are contained in the Appendix. 
7. Computational results 
We implemented the algorithm following the description given above. The order 
in which nodes are brought into equilibrium does not affect the termination of the 
algorithm, but is critical to the overall performance. Given an equilibrium for K 
nodes, selecting the next node to bring into the equilibrium is analogous to selecting 
an entering variable in linear programming. Here, as in linear program programm- 
ing, there are many methods for selecting the entering node, and the appropriate 
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heuristic will depend heavily on the structure of the input data. Since our input data 
was randomly generated, we have largely left open the problem of determining the 
'best' heuristic. 
We implemented two 'extreme' selection procedures. The first is analogous to full 
pricing in linear programming and is dynamic, in the sense that the selection of the 
entering node is based on the prices and costs from the K node equilibrium. Given 
the equivalent quadratic programming problem, the K + 1-st node is selected to max- 
imize the partial derivative of the objective function with respect o first entering 
flow variable. This procedure requires, in effect, N -K  applications of the 0-ratio 
test, and is therefore quite expensive. 
The second method pre-orders the nodes before initiating the algorithm and 
brings the nodes into equilibrium using the pre-order. For problems with dominant 
market structure we first brought in the large markets, alternating suppliers and 
demanders, and then the small markets in random order. For the test problems 
without market structure (i.e., all markets are probabilistically identical) we ran- 
domly ordered the nodes. Our computational results indicate that full pricing lowers 
the total number of iterations, but is computationally too expensive when a 
reasonable ordering is available based on known market structure. All of the 
reported CPU times are based on the pre-order method since the times were lower 
than under full-pricing. 
The ordering chosen in the pre-order method is based on intuition that implies 
the equilibrium for the dominant markets hould be stable. By this we mean, in the 
final equilibrium the positive arcs between dominant markets hould be nearly iden- 
tical to the positive arcs in the equilibrium in the subproblem containing just the 
dominant markets. Adding in the small markets hould have almost no effect on 
the flows between the dominant markets. In terms of the pivots, once the dominant 
market equilibrium is computed the remaining subproblems should, in general, re- 
quire at most one or two pivot. Therefore, we expect he number of pivots needed 
to find the equilibrium for a dominant market o be much larger than the number 
of pivots needed to find the equilibrium for a small market. We will supply com- 
putational evidence to show that this is the case. 
The code was written in ANSI standard FORTRAN-77 and implemented on a 
VAX 11/780. It is split into four basic subroutines. These are 
NXNOD: Manages the entering of new nodes, 
RATIO: Performs the 0-ratio test, 
UPDATE: Updates the solution and the data structures, 
REROOT: Reroots trees. 
Most of the work to compute quilibria is performed by the 0-ratio test. Therefore; 
the selection of the appropriate data structures is largely determined by the com- 
putations needed to compute 0. Suppose node K is being brought into the 
equilibrium. At any iteration T(K), the tree containing K, is rooted with root K. 
To find 02 it is necessary to visit all reverse arcs of T(K). To find 03 it is necessary 
to scan all nodes in equilibrium outside T(K). Thus, to find 0 we need to search 
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along all the trees in the solution and identify the orientation of the arcs at each 
node. We used standard network data structures to store the data (see, for example, 
Kennington and Helgason (1980)), adding one additional node length data structure 
to simplify the computation of 02. If K is an importer and arc (k, l) is a reverse arc 
of T(K), then D(Fl) is the sum of the slopes of all successors of ! (see the formula 
for 02 in Section 5.2(b)). We used a data structure, the weighted successor label, 
that stores D(FI) for each node in the solution forest. 
We tested the algorithm on 100 problems generated by varying the number of 
markets, the number of large markets, and the size of the transportation costs. For 
each problem size of 50, 100, 150, and 200 markets, we generated demand ata with 
8%, 18%, 32%, and 64% large markets. All test problems have an equal number 
of large suppliers and large demanders. For each problem size we also generated an 
additional problem with random market structure in which all markets are pro- 
babilistically identical. 
For each pair of problem size and market structure, we generated transportation 
costs by uniformly distributing the markets on squares of size 5 x 5, 10 × 10, 20 × 20, 
40 x 40, and 80 x 80 and setting the costs equal to the Euclidean distances between 
the markets. We generated the demand ata by randomly (uniformly) generating the 
isolated equilibrium prices (slope/constant) and the slopes of the demand functions. 
The intervals used for large suppliers, large demanders, little markets, and random 
markets are shown in Table 1. 
In all test problems the underlying network contained all N(N- 1) arcs. Computa- 
tionally, this is an undesirable assumption since in practice networks tend to be 
sparse. The algorithm can be extended to handle sparse networks directly (i.e., 
without adding the missing arcs and using a shortest path algorithm to assign costs). 
We have not yet implemented this extension of the algorithm (see Schneider (1984)). 
Since the test results for each problem are quite similar, we have reported only 
the results for the 100 and 200 node problems with three levels of cost data. We will 
be happy to supply complete results to interested readers. Tables 2 and 3 show the 
distribution of the iterations needed to solve the subproblems. To show the 
algorithm's ability to concentrate its work in low dimensions, we have grouped the 
subproblems separating the large and small markets (recall, the equilibrium is first 
found for the large markets). In each table the broken line separates the large and 
small markets. Clearly, for problems with dominant market structure, most itera- 
tions are performed in lower dimensions. 
Table 1 
Price Slope 
Large suppliers [0.1,1 ] [8,10] 
Large demanders [15,20] [8,10] 
Small markets [7,10] [1,3] 
Random markets [0.1,20] [ 1,10] 
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Table 2 
Distribution of iterations - 100 node problems a 
Costs on 10x 10 square: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
8 Lg. 15 I 5 5 7 7 10 8 14 11 4 15 12 7 
16 Lg. 14 25 4 8 12 8 14 8 7 8 15 16 13 
32 Lg. 17 21 33 41 I 11 I0 13 8 10 9 13 10 7 
64Lg. 17 30 45 41 40 61 71 61 I 8 11 I1 14 5 
Random 5 19 23 27 47 53 30 60 48 56 68 47 16 
120 
152 
203 
415 
499 
Costs on 20 x 20 square: 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
8 Lg. 9 I 6 9 7 11 7 7 6 16 10 9 9 
16 Lg~ 16 27 I 8 7 6 16 16 12 8 11 11 11 
32 Lg. 13 18 37 42 I 9 7 9 9 6 12 11 14 
64Lg. 10 14 19 29 31 47 39 47 9 9 6 8 
Random 6 14 25 13 33 21 22 54 29 38 32 47 
Costs on40x40square :  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
6 112 
7 156 
9 196 
7 275 
18 352 
13 Total 
8 Lg. 7 3 7 4 4 3 6 2 6 5 6 8 2 
16 Lg. 6 l l  7 4 6 9 3 4 6 4 4 14 3 
32 Lg. 9 12 14 19 9 5 5 6 6 8 7 7 3 
64 Lg. 5 11 12 17 15 17 27 27 I 8 3 7 8 7 
Random 0 7 12 4 12 18 l l  19 14 22 20 27 9 
63 
81 
110 
164 
175 
a Each row corresponds to one test problem. For example, row 1 is the number of iterations needed to 
solve the 100 node problem with 8 large markets and 92 small markets. Each entry in columns 1 through 
12 is the number of iterations for eight consecutive subproblems. For example, column 1 is the iterations 
needed for subproblems 1 through 8; column 2 is the iterations needed for subproblems 9 through 16; 
etc. Column 13 is the number of iterations needed for the last four subproblems. 
To show the stability property of problems with dominant market structure, we 
collected data showing that the set of basic arcs in the equilibrium for the large 
markets does not substantially change when the smaller markets are brought into 
the equilibrium. We have reported only the results the 100 node problem where the 
markets are distributed on the square of size 10 x 10 (see Table 4). The first column 
is the number of positive arcs in the equilibrium for the large markets only. The se- 
cond column is the number of positive arcs between large markets in the equilibrium 
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Table 3 
Distribution of iterations - 200 node problems a 
Costs on 10x 10 square: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
I 
16 Lg. 50 [ 14 19 12 17 16 23 19 
32 Lg. 44 107 15 19 21 23 27 26 
81 140 142 [ 15 21 22 20 64Lg.  44 
128 Lg. 53 101 140 125 104 119 149 178 
Random 33 74 71 107 130 142 96 118 
Costs on 20 x 20 square: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
28 27 38 34 23 
33 28 26 32 12 
19 23 23 20 9 
22 21 18 18 7 
126 170 202 166 48 
320 
413 
579 
1055 
1483 
9 10 11 12 13 Total 
I 
16 Lg. 37 I 12 16 23 
32 Lg. 28 52 19 19 
64Lg.  32 78 92 91 
128 Lg. 33 66 88 89 
Random 24 45 54 70 
Costs on 40 × 40 square: 
1 2 
20 12 21 23 24 28 21 16 
17 16 15 18 26 25 33 21 
13 18 18 26 23 35 19 21 
88 137 114 114 18 19 22 23 
84 72 74 91 89 97 151 91 
10 263 
14 303 
13 479 
13 824 
51 993 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
16 Lg. 26 9 14 7 9 14 15 17 5 19 11 6 7 
32 Lg. 21 38 18 19 15 20 16 17 13 12 14 12 9 
64 Lg. 18 32 42 40 19 19 21 20 23 14 17 20 6 
128 Lg. 6 44 51  51 62 63 78 76 18 13 13 14 7 
Random 11 22 35 47 50 45 36 39 57 51 82 55 31 
159 
224 
291 
496 
561 
a Each entry in columns 1 through 12 is the number of iterations needed for sixteen consecutive sub- 
problems. Column 13 is the number of iterations needed for the last eight subproblems. 
for the full 100 market problem. The third column is the number of arcs common 
to both problems, and the fourth column is the total number of positive arcs in the 
full problem. The third column shows that most arcs that are positive in the domi- 
nant market subproblem remain positive for the rest of the algorithm. This clearly 
shows that the forest structure for the large markets is computationally stable. We 
do not have a characterization of a large market in terms of its demand function 
and, therefore, no proof that dominant market structure should possess such a 
stability property. This is an area of future research. 
We implemented the algorithm in both single and double precision. Since the 
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Table 4 
Stability of dominant market equilibrium (# of nodes = 100, costs on l0 x 10 square) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Market structure Large equil. Full equil. Large & full # of positive arcs 
8 5 5 5 72 
16 9 l0 9 76 
32 26 27 24 89 
64 58 54 53 93 
Random - - - 82 
(1) = Number of positive arcs in the equilibrium for the subproblem with the large markets only. 
(2) = Number of positive arcs between large markets in the equilibrium for the entire economy (i.e., arcs 
counted in both column I and column 2). 
(3) = Number of arcs that were positive at the equilibrium for the large markets and the entire economy. 
(4) = Number of positive arcs in the equilibrium for the entire economy. 
behavior was identical in both cases, we have reported the CPU times for single 
precision. Table 5 gives the CPU seconds needed for each problem. The times 
reported do not include the time needed to input and output the data. The CPU 
times for the problems with dominant market structure show that the algorithm can 
exploit his structure. Even if it is not present, however, the algorithm still processes 
the problem reasonably fast. Note also that when the costs are large (and, therefore, 
the optimal forest is sparse), the algorithm exploits parsity and finds an equilibrium 
extremely fast. 
It is difficult o draw conclusions from CPU times for an algorithm without com- 
paring them to the times from other algorithms. We have not compared our 
algorithm with others using the same test problems and the same machine, so only 
tentative comparisons can be drawn. For example, the hundred node problems we 
solved required at most 5 seconds using a Vax 11/780, a minicomputer. On similar 
sized problems Pang and Lee (1980) required approximately 45seconds using a Dec 
20, a mainframe computer. It would seem that the strategy (or perhaps the im- 
plementation) we have used is appropriate for large scale problems. 
8. Summary 
In this paper we have developed an algorithm for the single-commodity spatial 
equilibrium problem. The algorithm is new in the sense that it is not a network im- 
plementation f an existing algorithm. The algorithm exploits the iteraction between 
models and algorithms, and allows modellers to incorporate their intuition about 
the model into the implementation f the algorithm. The underlying model was used 
to develop a variable dimension strategy with a natural economic interpretation. 
The implementation exploits knowledge of the market structure and uses it to push 
most of the computational effort into lower dimensions. This together with the net- 
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Table 5 
CPU seconds (VAX 11/780) 
50 Node problems: 
Costs 
Market structure 5 x 5 sq. 10 x 10 sq. 20 x 20 sq 40 × 40 sq. 80 x 80 sq. 
4 Lg. 0.51 0.42 0.25 0.15 0.08 
8 Lg. 0.44 0.41 0.27 0.17 0.11 
16 Lg. 0.51 0.38 0.39 0.28 0.14 
32 Lg. 0.63 0.63 0.51 0.29 0.21 
Random 1.22 0.73 0.71 0.38 0.17 
100 Node problems: 
Costs 
Market structure 5 x 5 sq. l0 × l0 sq. 20 x 20 sq 40 x 40 sq. 80 x 80 sq. 
8 Lg. 2.45 1.44 1.37 0.70 0.29 
16 Lg. 1.98 1.45 1.65 0.87 0.50 
32 Lg. 2.24 1.92 1.81 1.03 0.69 
64 Lg. 3.36 3.14 2.04 1.18 0.75 
Random 7.51 4.80 2.85 1.22 0.89 
150 Node problems: 
Costs 
Market structure 5 x 5 sq. 10 x l0 sq. 20 x 20 sq 40 x 40 sq. 80 x 80 sq. 
12 Lg. 6.26 4.27 3.20 1.43 0.99 
24 Lg. 6.20 3.20 4.66 1.75 1.05 
48 Lg. 5.51 5.00 2.97 2.16 1.27 
98 Lg. 11.77 8.14 4.72 3.68 1.80 
Random 19.86 16.14 7.05 2.99 1.34 
200 Node problems: 
Market structure 
Costs 
5x5  sq. 10x 10 sq. 20x20 sq 40x40 sq. 80x80 sq. 
16 Lg. 16.87 11.37 5.25 3.10 2.18 
32 Lg. 14.34 10.28 7.90 3.85 1.93 
64 Lg. 13.98 9.93 7.37 4.31 2.05 
128 Lg. 29.82 17.67 12.66 6.07 3.24 
Random 59.96 40.14 21.02 7.52 3.39 
work implementation produces an algorithm that can solve real-sized problems 
effectively. 
9. Appendix 
The convergence proof given in Section 5 depends on a non-degeneracy assump- 
tion, which we want to make precise. We then show that a simple pivoting scheme, 
is available that guarantees convergence in the presence of degeneracy. First, we 
need the following definition. 
A variable-dimension homotopy 
Definition. Let (p, x) be an equilibrium for nodes 
degenerate if 
Wi, j :P i - -p j+c i ,  j>O whenever (i , j)qAx. 
(K). 
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Then (p, x) is non- 
The non-degeneracy assumption implicit in the description of the algorithm is 
contained in the hypotheses of the following lemma. 
Lemma 9.1. Given a non-degenerate equilibrium for nodes (K -  1 ), the algorithm 
terminates in a finite number of steps to a non-degenerate equilibrium for nodes 
(K) if the following two conditions hold: 
(1) (a) L <pK<- U implies L<PK< U, 
(b) PK > U implies Argmin/{ Pi + ci, K } is unique, 
(c) PK < L implies ArgMaxj { p j -  cK, j } is unique, and 
(2) if (b) or (c) holds, then throughout the algorithm to solve the subproblem for 
nodes (K) there are no ties in the O-ratio test. 
Proof. (a) If L<pr<U,  it follows from the definition of L and U that 
wi, r, wK, j>O for all i, j e (K -1) ;  therefore, the new equilibrium is non- 
degenerate. 
(b) or (c). We assume PK> U (the case o f,0r< L is completely analogous). Initial- 
ly, 01>0. Since ( i , j )eA x implies xi, j>O, we have 02>0. By assumption (1), 
03r=D(F) K>0. Since (p,x) is non-degeneracy, O~,t=D(F)wk, t>O for z, Wi, 
k e (K -  1 ) \ F and I e F \  {K}; therefore, 03> 0. This implies 0 > 0. Assumption (2) 
implies that at each pivot all variables in the definition of 0 are positive; therefore, 
0 > 0 at every pivot. [] 
Lemma 9.2. Let (p, x) be an equilibrium for nodes (K) generated by the algorithm 
with b'r<bK, where b'r is the current value of the constant erm in the excess- 
demand function at node K (again we assume that PK > U). Let (F, E) be defined 
as in the algorithm. Suppose wk, t>0 for k~ (K) \F  and I~F, then 0>0. 
Proof. Follows immediately from the definition of 0. [] 
Lemma 9.3. The Degenerate Pivot Algorithm terminates after at most K -  1 applica- 
tions of Step 2 with a tree, (F, E), that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 9.2. 
Proof. The algorithm clearly terminates since each time Step 2 is performed the size 
of F increases. Also (F, E) must be a tree since if (k, l) is added in Step 2, (F(k), 
E(k)) is a tree. Since termination implies V is empty, the condition of Lemma 9.2 
must be satisfied. Since a tree can have at most K -  1 arcs, the algorithm must ter- 
minate after at most K -  1 steps. [] 
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After a finite number of degenerate pivots a non-degenerate pivot must be per- 
formed for which 0>0.  Therefore, the algorithm must converge after a finite 
number of pivots. This completes the proof of convergence. 
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